[ Pobierz całość w formacie PDF ]
.It is preciselyin this regard that Hegel makes his most important move in recon-ciling Fichte and Spinoza: re-interpreting the concept of freedomitself.In his lectures on world history Hegel often uses Fichte slanguage in describing freedom.He states that the self is self-positing, and that it is what it makes of itself (VG 55.58/48, 50).Yet, despite the apparent similarity of language, Hegel s underlyingconcept is very different from Fichte s.27 Contrary to Fichte, Hegelthinks that freedom involves necessity, and he accepts Spinoza sdefinition of freedom in the Ethica: That thing is called free thatexists from the necessity of its own nature alone and is determined Absolute Idealism 75into action by itself alone (Part I, def.7).28 Both Fichte and Hegelsee freedom in terms of self-determination; but their concepts aresimilar in name only.Self-determination in Hegel means that (1) Ihave a specific essence or nature, and that (2) it is natural andnecessary for it to be realized.Fichte denies both these points,because (1) his self is only what it posits itself to be, having no pre-existing essence or nature, and (2) it can choose between differentcourses of action.The question arises, however, how any finite agent or humanbeing can be free in Spinoza s sense.Spinoza s concept of freedomseems to apply only to God, because he alone acts from thenecessity of his own nature.All finite modes of the single infinitesubstance are determined into action by other finite modes, and soon ad infinitum.Ultimately, Hegel adopts the same solution to thisproblem as Spinoza: I am free in so far as I am really identical withthe whole universe; I realize this freedom only in so far as I becomeaware of this identity through philosophy, what Spinoza calls theintellectual love of God.The same concept resurfaces in Hegelthrough his concept of reconciliation, which teaches the self toaccept the necessity of the world in so far as he finds his identityin it.It should be clear that Hegel s concept of freedom implies a formof compatibilism, the doctrine that the claims of freedom anddeterminism can be made compatible.Hegel upholds the funda-mental dictum of all compatibilism: to say that the self is free doesnot mean that its acts are undetermined; my willing to do some-thing does not exclude, but indeed implies, that I have been deter-mined to will it.In adopting such compatibilism Hegel believedthat he could avoid the need to postulate any form of dualism tosave freedom.Even if all my actions were part of the natural orderand could not be otherwise, I was still free in doing them as long asI wanted to do so.We will later investigate some of the problems ofthis compatibilism (pp.263 6). 76 HegelTHE MYTH OF PANLOGICISM?One of the fundamental issues of Hegel s absolute idealism con-cerns the status of contingency.Some scholars maintain thatHegel s position commits him to panlogicism , i.e.the doctrinethat everything happens of necessity according to reason.Othershold, however, that Hegel fully recognizes the reality of contin-gency, and that he is indeed one of the first modern philosophersto argue for the necessity of contingency.29 For these scholars,the panlogicist interpretation is best consigned to the dustbin ofintellectual history as one of the Hegel myths and legends.30Both interpretations have a point.The panlogicists have a strongcase, insufficiently appreciated by their critics.Their interpretationfollows from two premises, both of them indisputable.First, Hegelholds that the absolute is causi sui, existing from the necessity of itsown nature alone.Second, Hegel also maintains that the absolute isall reality, having nothing outside itself to limit it.Both premisesentail that everything exists by the necessity of the divine nature.If,per contra, we introduce something contingent into Hegel s system,it would have to be outside the absolute, which would limit it andmake it finite.Hegel therefore seems to be as committed to pan-logicism as Spinoza, who holds that everything exists of necessityin the single infinite substance.The advocates of contingency also have a point.Hegel insists thatphilosophy must explain the finite world; and he holds that one ofthe central characteristics of finitude is contingency, the fact thatsomething could be or not be.If, therefore, philosophy is to explainthe finite world, it must establish the necessity of contingency.Indeed, Hegel regards Spinoza s failure to explain finitude as themain flaw of his system.Hegel would be guilty of just such failure,though, if he could not explain the reality of contingency itself.It is important to see that it would not satisfy Hegel to limitcontingency to appearances in the subjective sense, i.e.what appearsto, and exists only for, the finite understanding.When Hegel insiststhat philosophy explain finitude he means appearance in the Absolute Idealism 77stronger objective sense, where it signifies the manifestation, expres-sion or embodiment of the idea, whether it is perceived by the finiteintellect or not
[ Pobierz całość w formacie PDF ]