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.If we preferexamples, which are real, to such as are feign'd, we may consider thefollowing one, which is to be met with In almost every writer, that hastreated of the laws of nature.Two Grecian colonies, leaving their nativecountry, in search of new feats, were inform'd that a city near them wasdeserted by its inhabitants.To know the truth of this report, theydispatch'd at once two messengers, one from each colony; who findingon their approach, that their information was true, begun a race togetherwith an intention to take possession of the city, each of them for hiscountrymen.One of these messengers, finding that he was not an equalmatch for the other, launch'd his spear at the gates of the city, and was sofortunate as to fix it there before the arrival of his companion.Thisproduc'd a dispute betwixt the two colonies, which of them was theproprietor of the empty city and this dispute still subsists amongphilosophers.For my part I find the dispute impossible to be decided,and that because the whole question hangs upon the fancy, which in thiscase is not possess'd of any precise or determinate standard, upon whichit can give sentence.To make this evident, let us consider, that if thesetwo persons had been simply members of the colonies, and notmessengers or deputies, their actions wou'd not have been of any consequence; since in that case their relation to the colonies wou'd havebeen but feeble and imperfect.Add to this, that nothing determin'd themto run to the gates rather than the walls, or any other part of the city, butthat the gates, being the most obvious and remarkable part, satisfy thefancy best in taking them for the whole; as we find by the poets, whofrequently draw their images and metaphors from them.Besides we mayconsider, that the touch or contact of the one messenger is not properlypossession, no more than the piercing the gates with a spear; but onlyforms a relation; and there is a relation, in the other case, equallyobvious, tho' not, perhaps, of equal force.Which of these relations, then,conveys a right and property, or whether any of them be sufficient forthat effect, I leave to the decision of such as are wiser than myself.8.Present possession is plainly a relation betwixt a person and an object;but is not sufficient to counter-ballance the relation of first possession,unless the former be long and uninterrupted: In which case the relationis encreas'd on the side of the present possession, by the extent of time,and dlminish'd on that of first possession, by the distance, This changein the relation produces a consequent change in the property.9.This source of property can never be explain'd but from theimaginations; and one may affirm, that the causes are here unmix'd.Weshall proceed to explain them more particularly, and illustrate them byexamples from common life and experience.It has been observed above, that the mind has a natural propensity to joinrelations, especially resembling ones, and finds a hind of fitness anduniformity in such an union.From this propensity are deriv'd these lawsof nature, that upon the first formation of society, property always followsthe present possession; and afterwards, that it arises from first or fromlong possession.Now we may easily observe, that relation is not confin'dmerely to one degree; but that from an object, that is related to us, weacquire a relation to every other object, which is related to it, and so on,till the thought loses the chain by too long a progress, However therelation may weaken by each remove, `tis not immediately destroy'd; butfrequently connects two objects by means of an intermediate one, whichis related to both.And this principle is of such force as to give rise to theright of accession, and causes us to acquire the property not only of suchobjects as we are immediately possess'd of; but also of such as are closelyconnected with them. Suppose a German, a Frenchman, and a Spaniard to come into a room,where there are plac'd upon the table three bottles of wine, Rhenish,Burgundy and Port; and suppose they shou'd fall a quarrelling about thedivision of them; a person, who was chosen for umpire wou'd naturally,to shew his impartiality, give every one the product of his own country:And this from a principle, which, in some measure, is the source ofthose laws of nature, that ascribe property to occupation, prescription andaccession.In all these Cases, and particularly that of accession, there is first anatural union betwixt the Idea of the person and that of the object, andafterwards a new and moral union produc'd by that right or property,which we ascribe to the person.But here there occurs a difficulty, whichmerits our attention, and may afford us an opportunity of putting to tryalthat singular method of reasoning, which has been employ'd on thepresent subject.I have already observ'd that the imagination passes withgreater facility from little to great, than from great to littie, and that thetransition of ideas is always easier and smoother in the former case thanin the latter.Now as the right of accession arises from the easy transitionof ideas, by which related objects are connected together, it shou'dnaturally be imagin'd, that the right of accession must encrease instrength, in proportion as the transition of ideas is perform'd withgreater facility
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